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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

MOSCOW AND PÉKING PROPAGANDA TREATMENT
OF MAJOR SPEECHES AT THE 15TH UNGA SESSION

27 September 1960

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KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH: Given unprecedented publicity by Moscow, summarized without comment by Peking.

Some 400 Moscow radio items publicizing Khrushchev's speech in the three days after it was delivered add up to more than twice the publicity given his UNGA speech last year and greater attention than Moscow has ever paid any Khrushchev speech. Moscow broadcast the text "live" in the home and regional services, and, following customary practice, beamed summaries to foreign audiences. A very large volume of supporting comment is what makes this volume unprecedented. The 400 items include 220 summaries of the speech itself--not an unprecedented number of broadcast versions of a Khrushchev speech, but a number exceeded by rebroadcasts of only three Khrushchev speeches in the past five years.

Moscow commentators hail the speech as a "bold new peace initiative" that drew "wide acclaim" from world public opinion and caused "confusion and alarm" in Western "ruling circles." The "greater part" of the U.S. press is said to have made a concerted effort to minimize the import of the speech. Most commentaries, including PRAVDA's 26 September editorial, focus on Khrushchev's proposals for disarmament and liquidating colonialism. Comparatively little attention has been given his proposals for replacing the U.N. Secretary General with a three-man committee and for moving U.N. headquarters.

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Peking, alone among the bloc countries, has so far made no comment whatever on the speech. It reported briefly on 24 September that Khrushchev spoke. On the 25th NCNA came out with a 1,600-word summary, including all of Khrushchev's major points but containing no editorializing whatever. This summary has been reprinted in the CPR press and broadcast in greatly shortened form in domestic and foreign-language news programs. On 27 September NCNA reports that the Peking press carries "excerpts" of the disarmament plan and "declaration of independence" for colonial countries which the Soviet delegation submitted to the General Assembly. There is still no comment.

NCNA's summary of Khrushchev's speech duly reports his remarks on U N. membership for the CPR. Peking carries its first full-length commentary on that issue on 27 September--an NCNA item ranting against a "U.S. campaign of hostility and slander against China" but saying nothing about the Soviet move to get the CPR admitted.

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH: Published in full in IZVESTIA, summarized in other Soviet media, depreciated by Moscow commentators. Summarized by Peking in a longer but more denunciatory account than TASS's, and ignored in Peking comment.

Moscow disparages the speech as "colorless," "mere sophistry," "disappointing," and "nothing new." Its harshest comment--in a 24 September IZVESTIA dispatch, reviewed by TASS but not voicecast--is that "one can hardly escape the impression that statesmanship is on an indefinite leave of absence from Washington." Its most favorable observation is that "many people" noted the "entirely quiet and restrained tone" of the speech. This observation appeared only in a talk for foreign audiences; it was deleted from a home service version of the same commentary. Soviet media have not picked up Khrushchev's impromptu remark to a correspondent that the speech was "conciliatory."

TASS devoted 600 words to the speech in its account of the 22 September session, and Moscow used the TASS report in its foreign-language broadcasts.

The home service carried a shortened version. The government organ IZVESTIA published the text of the speech (unusual but not unprecedented textual coverage of a Presidential pronouncement in a Soviet central newspaper). The party organ PRAVDA, which carried the text of Ghana President Nkrumah's speech, published only a summary of the President's.

Some 50 Moscow radio commentaries have been devoted to the speech. For the most part, they have elaborated critical remarks interjected by TASS in its 600-word account: TASS reported that the President advanced a "so-called" five-point program for Africa; commentators said the African delegates seemed bored and that "the aid [for Africa] proposed by the United States is insignificant." TASS said the President "touched on the need" for peaceful use of outer space, "virtually buried" the idea of general and complete disarmament, spoke up "again" for "virtual legalization of espionage," and said nothing about the "urgent problem" of ending nuclear tests; commentators have picked up all these themes for foreign and domestic audiences alike.

Peking's NCNA reported briefly on 23 September that the President gave "a long speech," then followed up later in the day with a heavily slanted 1,200-word account--twice as long as TASS's and much more denunciatory. The NCNA account says the President devoted more than half his speech to "advocating the U.S. Government's policy of aggression against Africa through continued, intensified use of the U.N.," and that he repeated "hackneyed" U.S. statements "obstructing" disarmament. The Peking press on 24 September carried the NCNA report. Radio Peking voicecast a truncated version of it to

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domestic and a few foreign audiences--typical handling of a Presidential statement. No Peking commentary has been devoted to the speech (although NCNA reports that PEOPLE'S DAILY reprinted a commentary from the North' Vietnam daily NHAN DAN which calls the speech "hypocritical").

TITO SPEECH: Reported uncritically by TASS and Radio Moscow, with stress on plea for disarmament; discussed approvingly by Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croat. Denounced in heavily slanted Peking report, with no mention of Tito's support for Soviet disarmament plan.

Moscow treated Tito's speech more objectively than the President's. The
23 September TASS account, repeated in Moscow's domestic and foreign-language
broadcasts, is about as long as the account of the President's speech but
entirely devoid of editorializing. It singles out points with which the USSR
has no quarrel: Tito's remark on the danger inherent in the theory that
tactical use of nuclear weapons is permissible; his profession of "alarm" at
the revival of "actual disarmament," and his call for disarmament talks "on
a wider basis." TASS reports Tito's praise of Khrushchev's September 1959
proposal for general and complete disarmament and notes that he urged acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet account omits
Tito's call for at least "partial" disarmament—a notion virtually ignored in
Soviet propaganda over the past year, although there is a provision for
partial measures in the USSR's September 1959 universal-disarmament proposal.

There is no available Soviet central press or home service comment on the speech. But a commentary broadcast exclusively in Serbo-Croat on 23 September applauded Tito's stress on general and complete disarmament, contrasting it with the President's "generalities" about disarmament in a "remote" future.

CONFIDENTIAL

page 4

Peking's brief account--published in the CPR press and summarized in domestic and foreign-language broadcasts--assails Tito for "trying to sell his false, revisionist arguments of 'peaceful, active coexistence' and 'overall international cooperation,'" and for "parroting the tune of U.S. imperialism" in advocating aid to the underdeveloped countries via the U.N. Peking notes in a critical vein that Tito, in talking to reporters after his speech, praised the President's address as a "positive" one. The Peking account says nothing about Tito's support of the Soviet disarmament proposal, or for that matter about any of his remarks on disarmament. It also ignores his approval of U.N. membership for the CPR.

OTHER SPEECHES: Heaviest play for Castro, Nkrumah speeches.

Moscow's summaries of the proceedings gave the Castro and Nkrumah speeches the most space next to Khrushchev's. TASS gave Castro's speech 2,500 words, Nkrumah's 1,300--in both cases more than it gave the President's. (Some 500-600 words were devoted to the speeches by satellite leaders Shehu and Novotny, about the same amount as to the President's.) Moscow gave short shrift to Secretary General Hammarskjoeld's remarks: He simply "made a statement in reply to the sharp criticisms of his activity in relation to the Congo."

<u>Peking</u> devoted 900 words to Nkrumah's speech. No Peking report is yet available on the session at which Hammarskjoeld and Castro spoke.

CONFIDENTIAL

page 5